Trump has signed a sanctions law designed to squeeze Russia’s war economy—but the measure also gives the president unusually broad authority to decide how aggressively it will be used. The result is a policy meant to constrain Moscow that may instead expand presidential power at home and abroad.

The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act targets Russian oil and gas revenues, officials, banks, oligarchs, arms networks and the so-called “shadow fleet” of ships used to evade restrictions. It also extends sanctions on Iran, reflecting the administration’s preference for economic pressure as a means of forcing Tehran toward negotiations.¹

Conservatives present the measure primarily as an escalation of economic warfare. Their account emphasizes that Russia has continued financing its war through energy sales and that the law closes loopholes by pursuing both Russian entities and the foreign networks that help them. The legislation also marks a shift in Washington’s approach after earlier efforts to end the war stalled.

The liberal critique accepts the sanctions’ stated goal but focuses on the mechanism. The law allows Trump to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on countries buying Russian energy—including China—and on governments accused of helping Moscow evade sanctions. It also gives him discretion to determine which countries are targeted, what tariff rates apply and when sanctions can be waived.²

That contrast defines the bill’s central tension: supporters see flexibility as leverage, while critics see a delegation of congressional authority with few clear limits. The measure therefore strengthens pressure on Russia and Iran while simultaneously making enforcement more dependent on one president’s judgment. Its effectiveness may hinge less on the sanctions written into law than on how Trump chooses to wield the powers layered on top of them.